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NOTES
Another deficiency in the derivative action, even where readily
accessible, is the lack of stringency in the sanctions imposed. If this
device is to benefit any but the few investors financially able to prosecute
such litigation, its chief value must be as a deterrent. Federal legislation
may be the most appropriate instrumentality for transforming the deriva-
tive suit into an effective potential threat to instill greater responsibility
in corporate management. In a case of serious corruption, Congress could
empower a court of equity to remove the offending director; 61 double
or treble damages might be assessed against directors and officers guilty
of fraudulent misconduct. 62 In extreme cases, where the fraud has been
so pervasive as to seriously impair the company's going concern value,
the judicial power to wind up the corporation might be invoked by the
shareholder. 63
If shareholders must continue to place reliance in the derivative suit
as their chief bulwark against mismanagement, this remedy must be
greatly improved to render it adequate to the function it is designed to
perform. Sinc6 the states have so manifestly failed to accomplish the
needed adjustment between managerial discretion and responsibility, fed-
eral intervention is not only warranted but imperative. Perhaps the
suggested compromise between states' rights and the national interests
in the welfare of investors will render such intervention less repugnant.
TERMINATING CONDITIONS UNLIMITED IN TIME
While public planning has replaced individual freedom in the
allocation and utilization of resources in many areas of the economy,
land use in the United States remains primarily subject to private con-
61. The SEC is permitted under the Investment Companies Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-35 (1946), upon showing gross misconduct or abuse of trust, to obtain an injunction
against any officer, director, member of advisory board, investment advisor, depositor.
etc., from continuing to so act, either permanently or for such period as the court, in its
discretion, shall deem appropriate. The SEC might also be used as an advisory body to
the judiciary in derivative action cases.
62. E.g,, Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. 1951) (double
damages, plus attorney's fees and costs); Housing and Rent Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C.
APP. § 1895 (Supp. 1951) (treble damages, plus attorney's fees and costs).
63. The average stockholder does not desire liquidation, as he is likely to receive
more for his stock on the market than by dissolution. For a complete discussion of the
judicial power to wind up a corporation see Hornstein, A Remedy For Corporate
Abuse-Judicial Power to Wind Up A Corporation at the Suit of a Mhnority Stock-
holder, 40 COL. L. REv. 220 (1940); REUSCHLEIN, SCHOOLS OF CORPORATE REFORm 151
et seq. (1950).
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ditions or restrict the duration of privately imposed use restrictions. 55
The weakness of legislation is that its retroactive effect may be limited.
Hence, while statutes may constitutionally terminate conditions which
have become obsolete because of changes in the character of the neigh-
borhood or other similarly altered circumstances, the validity of an
attempt to .legislate an existing condition unlimited in time into one of
definite duration is questionable. Such legislation probably can have
only prospective effect.50 The existing judicial techniques for terminating
conditions subsequent are commendable and reasonably effective devices in
avoiding harsh forfeitures and preventing past actions from controlling
land use indefinitely. However, the traditional judicial reluctance to over-
ride precedent, the uncertainties of litigation, and the present inviolability
of determinable fees often result in the continuance of unwarranted re-
strictions long after the required use has become uneconomical and with-
out present value to anyone. While legislation could remedy many of these
defects, statutes have been infrequent and may well be constitutionally
inapplicable to those restrictions in effect at the time of enactment.
Transferors of land desiring to place reasonable restrictions upon
its future use should consider carefully the implications of the device
selected. Unless a future windfall in the form of a forfeiture is con-
templated, a covenant will ordinarily suffice and will avoid needless
penalties on the transferee. Moreover, in jurisdictions where rights of
re-entry and possibilities of reverter are non-alienable5 7 a covenant will
usually more nearly effectuate the transferor's intent and will redound
to his greater benefit. Restrictions beneficial to the land expressed in
terms of covenant -will survive conveyance to a stranger,58 thus, often
increasing the value and marketability of the retained estate.
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE AND COMPETENCY
IN INDIANA
The ultimate objective of exclusionary rules of evidence is to admit
all reliable facts, thereby facilitating just disposition of a legal con-
troversy, while rejecting all testimony so dubious as to render it repugnant
55. See Clark, Limiting Land Restrictions, 27 A.B.A.J. 737 (1941) ; WALSH, Con.-
ditional Estates and Covenants Rnnninrg with the Land, 14 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 162, 194
n.80 (1936) ; Legis., [1940] Wis. L. REv. 121 (1940).
56. See Clark, Limiting Land Restrictions, 27 A.B.A.J. 737, 739 (1941) ; Goldstein,
supra note 13, at 275 n.103.
57. See notes 2 and 3 supra.
58. WALSH, op. cit. supra note 55, at 165.
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trol. 1 A significant part of this control is exercised through the transfer
of land upon a condition subsequent, either by deed or will. These con-
ditions may require affirmative or negative conduct and single or suc-
cessive acts. Upon the breach of a condition, its creator or his heirs2
accrues a present right of re-entry, the exercise of which results in a
forfeiture.3
Since conditions subsequent are frequently unlimited as to time,
either expressly or because there is no reference to duration, literal en-
forcement might well restrict land use forever. Inevitably, alienability is
impaired and, in many instances, these conditions prevent the most
economical use of the land. Moreover, few remedies are more severe than
forfeiture. Alleviation of these undesirable results 4 has been a matter
of concern to most courts and a few legislatures.
1. See McDoUGAL AND HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND: ALLOCATION, PLANNING
AND DEVELOPMENT 113 (1948).
2. 1 TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §208 (3d ed., Jones, 1939). About
one fourth of the states have, by statute, made rights of re-entry transferable inter vivos.
2 POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 486 (1950). There is a conflict of authority
in the United States as to whether rights of re-entry are devisable. See 1 TIFFANY, op.
cit. supra, at 354.
3. 3 WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 14, 15 (1947); RE-
STATEMENT, PROPERTY § 45(b) (1936). The Restatement uses the term "power of
termination" instead of "right of re-entry." As to the respective merits of these terms,
compare RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 24, comment b (Special note), with 3 WALSH,
op. cit. supra, at 57, 58.
Estates on a condition subsequent should be distinguished from determinable estates,
which terminate automatically upon the occurrence of the event stipulated in the in-
strument creating the estate. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 44(b) (1936). Whether the
"possibility of reverter" remaining in the grantor is alienable inter vivos depends upon
whether a court views it as a reversion or as a mere possibility of reverter. The former
view seems more sound, see RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY §§ 159, 163 (1936) ; however,
it has not been widely accepted by the courts. See Roberts, Assignability of Possibilities
of Reverter and Rights of Re-entry, 22 B. U. L. REV. 43, 48 (1942). Whether a possi-
bility of reverter is devisable apparently depends upon the construction of the local
wills statute. 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 12 n.34.
4. There are additional reasons why these conditions should not continue in-
definitely. The successor of a grantee or devisee may be unaware of the condition, see
Ferrier, Determinable Fees and Fees Upon Condition Subsequent in California, 24 CALIF.
L. REV. 512, 516 (1936), or the breach may be unintentional or uncontrollable. See
Williams, Restrictions on the Use of Land: Conditions Subsequent and Determinable
Fees, 27 TEXAS L. REV. 158, 160 (1948). Also, it may become difficult to locate the
numerous heirs who may have become holders of the right of re-entry in order to
obtain a release, and the release will probably have to be purchased when such heirs
are found. Compliance with the condition may have ceased to be of any benefit to the
holders of the right of re-entry. Yet, the heirs may seek a forfeiture when the creator
of the condition would not have done so. Holders of a right of re-entry are usually
eager to participate in any compensation involved when the government exercises its
power of eminent domain, even though the exercise of the right of re-entry has been
waived upon numerous prior breaches. E.g., Santa Moncia v. Jones, 232 P.2d 55
(Cal. App. 1951). Finally, conditions of unlimited duration seriously impede the
creation of planned communities. See CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS
WHICH "RUN WITH THE LAND" 197, 204 (2d ed. 1947).
NOTES
Language which purports to create a condition is often construed
as establishing a covenant, especially where no right of re-entry is
expressly reserved. 5 Nevertheless, if the language employed indicates a
clear intent to create a condition subsequent, a court, generally, will so
interpret it.' If the condition contains no limitation as to time, or specifies
perpetual existence, it becomes important to examine the devices which
have been, or may be, used to limit the condition when it ceases to serve
a justifiable purpose.
Title which vests under a condition subsequent is not divested when
the condition becomes impossible of performance.7 Further, courts do
not hesitate to refuse their aid in the enforcement of covenants,8 ease-
ments, 9 or trusts'0 when changed conditions render their continuance
useless. There is clearly nothing illogical in subjecting restrictive con-
ditions to similar standards, since the common purpose of these creations
is to restrict the future use of property. Conditions subsequent, even
though technically permanent, could well be terminated when the pur-
pose which they were intended to achieve is no longer feasible. This
would obviously dispose of obsolete conditions whether created by will
or deed.
5. For examples of language construed as a covenant rather than a condition
subsequent, see the cases cited in 2 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 41 n.16; 1 TIFFANY,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 310 n.58. This is probably the most widespread means of avoid-
ing the declaration of a forfeiture.
Courts also frequently interpret doubtful language as creating a trust, 2 POWELL,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 41 n.18; TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 311 n.59; equitable
charge, 1 id. at 311 n.60; easement, 2 POWFLL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 41 n.17; or
merely a statement of the creator's motive which creates no obligation whatever, 2 id.
at 42 n.19.
The only significant exception to this policy of strict construction against the creator
is a body of cases involving conditions which provide for the support of the grantor,
or of some person designated by the grantor or testator. See Sheets v. Vandalia Ry., 74
Ind. App. 597, 606, 127 N.E. 609, 612 (1920) ; 1 TIFFANY, op. 'cit. supra note 2, § 216.
6. Certain words and phrases such as "upon condition," "so that," "provided," or
words of similar import, are peculiarly adapted to express such intention, particularly
when they are accompanied by an express reservation of a right of re-entry. See Brady
v. Gregory, 49 Ind. App. 355, 361, 97 N.E. 452, 454 (1911); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§45, comment j (1936).
But even where the court finds that the language creates, a condition subsequent,
a breach will not result in a forfeiture if it is found that the holder of the right of
re-entry has waived its exercise, 1 TIFFANY, Op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 204-207; 3 WALSH
op. cit. supra note 3, § 276; or has contributed to the breach, see 19 Amt. JUR. 545. n.10;
or that the condition is illegal, 1 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 196; or impossible
of performance, 1 id. § 195. Similarly, equity will relieve a forfeiture if the condition
requires only a payment of money, or the breach is unintentional and harmless. 1 id.
§ 215; 3 VALSH, op., cit. supra note 3, § 279.
7. Lutheran Church v. Lutheran Church, 316 I1. 196, 147 N.E. 53 (1925); Hoss
v. Hoss, 140 Ind. 551, 39 N.E. 255 (1894) ; Parker v. Parker, 123 Mass. 584 (1878).
8. See Notes, 54 A.L.R. 812 (1928) ; 76 A.L.R. 1358 (1932) ; 85 A.L.R. 985 (1933).
9. 2 WALSH, op. cit. supra note 3, § 253.
10. RESTATEMENT, TRusTs § 335, comment a (1935).
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Accordingly, in Letteau v. Ellis," the court, in refusing to allow a
forfeiture for breach of condition, declared the condition terminated
solely on the basis of changed conditions. The court expressly refused to
consider the "arguments on the technical rules and distinctions between
conditions, covenants, and mere restrictions," saying that: "A principle
of broad public policy has intervened to the extent that 'modern progress
is deemed to necessitate a sacrifice of many former claimed individual
rights.' 2 Most writers agree that the case is sound,13 but few courts are
likely to follow it expressly, in light of the years of precedent to the
contrary. However, other doctrines have been applied to prevent harsh
forfeitures under similar circumstances.
One such possibility is suggested by the decision in Meade v.
Ballard,14 where the deed stated that an institute "shall be permanently
located" upon the land within one year. The condition was construed
as one which might be fully performed within a year. It was sufficient
that the building be located upon the land with the intention that the loca-
tion should be permanent-even though the building burned ten years
later and was rebuilt elsewhere.: 5 This approach, unfortunately, confuses
the proper time within which the grantee must perform with what con-
stitutes a reasonable life for a condition. Its application may deny the
reasonable expectation of the creator.
Similar to the Meade case, though of differing effect, are those
decisions implying a condition of reasonable time where the duration is
unspecified in the language of the instrument creating the condition.'6
11. 122 Cal. App. 584, 10 P.2d 496 (1932).
12. Accord, Forman v. Hancock, 3 Cal. App.2d 291, 39 P.2d 249 (1934). See
Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 587, 205 S.W. 217, 221 (1918) ; cf. Trustees of Calvary
Presbyterian Church of Buffalo v. Putnam, 129 Misc. 506, 221 N.Y. Supp. 692, 698
(Sup. Ct., 1927).
13. See CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH THE
LAND" 197, 198 (2d ed. 1947) ; Ferrier, supra note 4, at 516; Goldstein, Rights of Entry
and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land, 54 HARV. L. REV.
248, 268-276 (1940) ; Walsh, Conditional Estates and Covenants Running with the Land,
14 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 162, 191-194 (1937); White, Reversionary Restrictions, 14 U. OF
CIN. L. REv. 524, 552-554 (1940) ; Note, 17 MINN. L. REV. 227 (1933).
14. 74 U.S. 29 (1869).
15. The Supreme Court has also held that "permanent" does not mean "forever"
when used in covenants by grantees. Texas & P. Ry. v. Marshall, 136 U.S. 393 (1890)
Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U.S. 548 (1879).
In Booth v. Los Angeles County, 124 Cal. App. 259, 12 P.2d 72 (1932), the deed
stated that it was granted for the purpose of a road or highway, and that the land
was to "revert" if not so used. After thirty-two years, the road was removed.
The court refused to enforce the cotidition, stating that its sole purpose had been
realized when a road or highway was established and accepted by the public.
16. The use of the reasonable time concept in this context should not be confused
with its use in the sense of requiring that performance of a condition prescribing an
affirmative act must be within a reasonable time, or that performance of a condition
248
NOTES
The most articulate decision on this basis indicates that the reason for
limiting the condition subsequent is that its performance was a part of
the consideration for the grant to which it was attached7 Enforcement
of the condition may be denied if the grantee or his successor has per-
formed for a time sufficient to constitute payment of the consideration,,8
and conversely, the forfeiture will be permitted if the court finds the con-
sideration has not been fully realized.19
Whether sufficient consideration has been received seems to depend,
primarily, upon the length of the compliance, and the surrounding cir-
cumstances. Thus, in Raiway Co. v. Birnie,20 the grantee was to build
and maintain a railroad depot, which was the only express consideration.
Finding that the language employed created a condition subsequent, the
trial court charged that the railroad was "required to locate its depot...
in good faith, and to keep it there for a reasonable length of time-that
is for such time as would give [plaintiffs] ample time and opportunity
to realize whatever benefit they expected, at the time of the donation,
from the location. ' 21 The upper court reversed a judgment for the
plaintiffs for failure to prove that they had not received sufficient consid-
eration when the depot was removed after eleven years. The court said:
"Eleven years, falling within this era of the city's growth, would seem
to be a sufficient period in which to obtain all the benefits constituting
the inducement to the plaintiffs' donation. '22
If no reference to time is made in the language creating the condi-
tion, it may logically be inferred that the intention of the parties was that
the condition should last only for a reasonable time. Such an inference
is more debatable where the language specifies that the condition is to
last forever, since the apparent intention was to create a perpetuity.23
An analogous approach, employed by some courts to frustrate the
possibility of a perpetuity by way of condition subsequent, is to deny
requiring successive or continuous acts mtust begin within a reasonable time, where the
time for such performance is not stated. E.g., Trustees of Union College v. City of
New York, 173 N.Y. 38, 65 N.E. 853 (1903).
17. Railway Co. v. Birnie, 59 Ark. 66, 26 S.W. 528 (1894).
18. Railway Co. v. Birnie, supra note 17; Coffin v. Portland, 16 Ore. 77, 17 Pac.
580 (1888) ; see Summer v. Darnell, 128 Ind. 38, 47, 27 N.E. 162, 165 (1890) ; Hunt v.
Beeson, 18 Ind. 380, 388 (1862); Stansbery v. First M. E. Church, 79 Ore. 155, 178,
154 Pac. 887,. 894 (1916).
19. Indianapolis, P. & C. Ry. v. Hood, 66 Ind. 580 (1879) ; Leach v. Leach, 4 Ind. 628
(1853); Ralston v. Hatfield, 81 Ind. App. 641, 143 N.E. 887 (1924).
20. 59 Ark. 66, 26 S.W. 528 (1894).
21. Id. at 72, 26 S.W. at 530.
22. Id. at 81, 26 S.W. at 532.
23. In many instances the grantor or testator probably had no intention. Un-
doubtedly, many conditions subsequent are only the products of lawyers' ingenuity and
not the result of the directions of grantors or testators.
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enforcement of the condition, after it has been in effect for many years,
by applying a doctrine of substantial compliance. 24 This doctrine is to be
distinguished from the implication of a condition of reasonable time,
since, in the latter situation, compliance which prevents a forfeiture is
complete performance of the implied condition, rather than mere sub-
stantial compliance. 20 The substantial comapliance cases suggest that when
the circumstances have so changed that further compliance ceases to
benefit the public in general, and the grantor or his heirs in particular,
the condition will be held to have been substantially performed. Again,
whether, or how much, consideration was paid by a grantee is considered
material in determining whether the grantor is entitled to further
benefit.26
The Indiana courts have frequently applied this test.27 In the leading
case of Sheets v. Vandalia R. Co.,28 the deed was executed solely in con-
sideration of the permanent location of a depot on the conveyed lot, the
performance being expressly for the.benefit of the public. After a doubt-
ful construction of ambiguous language as creating a condition subse-
quent, the court held that the erection and maintenance of the depot for
sixty-five years constituted substantial compliance with the condition. The
"conveyance was undoubtedly made subject to the general exigencies of
business and public interest,. and the change, modification and growth of
24. Substantial compliance, as employed in this context, should be distinguished
from the substantial performance doctrine as applied when a mere technical deviation
from the terms of a condition is held to be no breach. For illustrations of the latter,
see Santa Monica v. Jones, 232 P.2d 55 (Cal. App. 1951); Carter v. Branson, 79 Ind.
14 (1881) ; Crane v. Hyde Park, 135 Mass. 147 (1883) ; Osgood v. Abbott, 58 Me. 73
(1870); Rose v. Hawley, 141 N.Y. 366, 36 N.E. 335 (1894); Hardy v. Wiley, 87 Va.
125, 12 S.E. 234 (1890).
25. See GAVIT, THE INDIANA LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, DESCENT AND WILLS
133 (1934).26. Actually, the courts utilizing the substantial compliance theory have, in general,
failed to specify what elements must be present before the doctrine will be invoked.
However, an analogy is often made to the application of the doctrine in cases in-
volving covenants. See Texas & P. Ry. v. Scott,. 77 Fed. 726 (5th Cir. 1896), and
cases cited in Sheets v. Vandalia Ry., 74 Ind. App. 597, 613-614, 127 N. E. 609, 614-615
(1920) ; cf. Cunningham v. New York Central R. R., 114 Ind.. App. 90, 95, 48 N.E.
2d 176, 178 (1943).
27. Jeffersonville M. & I. Ry. v. Barbour, 89 Ind. 375 (1883) ; Railway Co. v. Cross,
87 Ind. App. 574, 162 N.E. 253 (1928) ; Sheets v. Vandalia Ry., 74 Ind. App. 597, 127
N.E. 609 (1920). See Higbee v. Rodeman, 129 Ind. 244, 247, 28 N.E. 442, 443 (1891).
See Brooks v. Kimball County, 127 Neb. 645, 256 N.W. 501 (1934); Hasman v. Elk
Grove Union High School, 76 Cal. App. 629, 245 Pac. 464 (1926). Jordan v. Hendricks,
91 Ind. App. 678, 173 N.E. 288 (1930), speaks of full compliance, though the facts are
analogous to the substantial compliance cases. Accord, Board of Commissioners v.
Russell, 174 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1949). See Notes, 6 IND. L. J. 452 (1931): 31 Col..
L. REV. 509 (1931) ; 3 OKLA. L. REV. 311 (1950).
28. 74 Ind. App. 597, 127 N.E. 609 (1920).
250
NOTES
transportation routes .... ,,29 However in Ralston v. Hatfield,30 and in
Indianapolis, P. & C. Ry. v. Hood.31 the Indiana courts refused to treat
the conditions as performed after eighteen years. In each case the court
emphasized that the condition's performance was the sole consideration
for the deed,32 and the opinions are devoid of discussion concerning
possible justification of the breach as a result of changed conditions.
Whild the doctrine of substantial compliance may be invoked in
cases involving changed circumstances, the cases indicate that, even
though circumstances are unchanged except as to time, the condition may,
not be enforced simply because the grantor has reaped a sufficient benefit
from the compliance, in view of the consideration originally paid.33 But,
it does not logically follow that a condition unlimited in time is sub-
stantially complied with by the mere passage of time.
To the extent that the cases which apply the doctrine of substantial
compliance or imply a condition of reasonable time rest upon the fulfill-
ment of long-term consideration, it is difficult to apply their reasoning to
conditions subsequent created by will. 34 This suggests that courts actually
consider more than merely the amount of consideration originally paid
by the grantee.3 5 The question of whether the grantor has received all
29. Id. at 617, 127 N.E. at 616, citing Railway Co. v. Birnie, 59 Ark. 66, 26 S.W.
528 (1894).
30. 81 Ind. App. 641, 143 N.E. 887 (1924).
31. 66 Ind. 580 (1879).
32. The Hood case was distinguished four years later in Jeffersonville M. & I.
Ry. v. Barbour, 89 Ind. 375 (1883). The Barbour case involved a deed specifying that
the grant was made "expressly for the use and purpose of depot grounds for the M.
and I. railroad" and for a consideration of five dollars. A right of re-entry was
expressly reserved. The court held that thirty-three years occupancy was a substantial
compliance with the condition, stating that: "It is not ... unreasonable to suppose that
the grantors received . . . all the benefits and advantages which they anticipated when
they made the conveyance." Id. at 379. In Sheets v. Vandalia Ry., 74 Ind. App. 597,
127 N.E. 609 (1920), the Hood case was said to have been discredited as authority in
Indiana. Nevertheless, the Hatfield and Hood cases are distinguishable from the
Barbour and Sheets decisions on the question of whether the long-term consideration
had been fully received.
For a collection of cases discussing the period covered by a covenant or condition
subsequent for the maintenance of a railroad, see Note, 7 A.L.R. 817 (1920).
33. Indianapolis, P. & C. Ry. v. Hood, 66 Ind. 580 (1879); Ralston v. Hatfield,
81 Ind. App. 641, 143 N.E. 887 (1924).
34. The similarity between covenants and conditions subsequent, see note 26 supra,
ceases at this point. Even though the acceptance of land devised on a condition sub-
sequent is regarded as an implied promise to comply with the condition, it is evident
that no contract exists for the death of the testator terminates the "offer." REsTATEmENT,
CONMAcTS §35(f) (1932). Hence, it is unsound to argue that the condition's per-
formance is a part of the consideration for the devise, unless there has been an exchange
of promises between the testator and devisee during the former's lifetime.
35. "It may be . .. that $5,700 was the full value of said real estate, still it would
not follow that the restrictive condition was without consideration. The fact that they
were permitted to purchase the same, even at its full value, affords a legal consideratiori
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of the performance for which he bargained is usually highly speculative.
Generally, the presence or absence of consideration merely supplies a
convenient verbal test for a decision on the merits. Basically, those de-
cisions which terminate conditions appear to rest upon sound equity. The
most important factor is the existence and extent of changed conditions
in the neighborhood, in view of the consequent severity of a forfeiture.
,Evidence of whether, or how much, money consideration was paid by the
grantee, as well as the extent to which he has improved the land, are
additional considerations in evaluating the severity of a forfeiture.
Courts are not disposed to view favorably the continuance of a re-
quirement that land be devoted to an uneconomical use. Such evidence
may often be d determinative factor in a court's decision to relieve a
forfeiture. In addition, the length of performance alone undoubtedly is
influential. Similarly, the courts are likely to look with disfavor at the
unreasonableness of the restraint upon alienation where the creator has
expressly attempted to establish a perpetuity by the use of a condition.
If the public ceases to derive advantages from a condition created
expressly for its benefit,3 6 there is justification for denying forfeiture.
When the purpose of a condition is to enhance the value of adjacent
land, its observance is of benefit to the holder of the right of re-entry
only so long as he retains rights in that adjacent land.3 7  Thus, when
he ceases to own the protected property, the condition, notwith-
standing its unlimited character, may be held to have been performed.
3 S
Even though the grantor rdtains adjacent land, the condition may be
terminated when it ceases to be of any benefit.3 9 Judicial conversion of a
fee on condition subsequent into a fee simple absolute constitutes no
which is sufficient, since we will not inquire into its adequacy in the absence of a
charge of fraud or overreaching." Boonville Milling Co. v. Roth, 73 Ind. App. 427, 435,
127 N.E. 823, 826 (1920).
It is true, however, that language is more readily construed as creating a con-
dition subsequent in the case of a voluntary deed than in one given for valuable con-
sideration. Olcott v. Gabert, 86 Tex. 121, 23 S.W. 985 (1893). See RESTATMENT,
PROPERTY § 45, comment p. (1936). This is also true where the land use specified in
the deed is the sole consideration. Cleveland C. C. & I. Ry. v. Coburn, 91 Ind. 557
(1883) ; Indianapolis P. & C. Ry. v. Hood, 66 Ind. 580 (1879).
36. See Sheets v. Vandalia Ry., 74 Ind. App. 597, 127 N.E. 609 (1920). However,
if the use prescribed by the deed is solely for the benefit of the public at large, and
does not inure to the benefit of the grantor, it is less likely to be construed as a condition.
Downen v. Rayburn, 214 Ill. 342, 73 N.E. 364 (1905).
37. Walsh, Conditional Estates and Covenants Running with the Land, 14
N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 162, 176 (1936).
38. Steven v. Galveston H. & S. A. Ry., 212 S.W. 639 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919);
Maddox v. Adair, 66 S.W. 811 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901); See Summer v. Darnell, 128
Ind. 38, 47, 27 N.E. 162, 165 (1890); First Christian Church v. Spinks, 260 S.W.
1073, 1075 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). This assumes the non-alienability of a right of
re-entry. See note 2 supra.
39. Daggett v. Fort Worth, 177 S.E. 222 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
NOTES
hardship upon the holder of the right of re-entry in such circumstances.
Nor is the reasonable expectancy of the grantor denied by judicial refusal'.
to enforce a condition because of materially altered circumstances.
The common weakness of judicial techniques for refusing to enforce
forfeitures is that usually an allegedt breach must have occurred prior to
court determination of the validity of the condition subsequent.40 The
holder of the fee on a condition subsequent may thus feel constrained to
continue a relatively uneconomical use of the land rather than risk the
uncertainties of judicial decision. Should a court's denial of forfeiture
be the equitable ground of changed conditions or the substantial com-
pliance formula, nominal damages may still be available to the holder of
the right of re-entry, if that right be construed as a legal interest. This
limited right may be held to constitute a cloud on title which would impair
the marketability of title.4 ' In such circumstances, the cloud should be
removable in a suit brought for that purpose. This necessity would not
arise under legislative termination of obsolete restrictions.
Perhaps the simplest judicial solution would be to bring rights of
re-entry within the Rule Against Perpetuities. This rule of thumb could
easily be applied by the courts, and, indeed, has been so used in Eng-
land.42 American courts, however, have held otherwise. 43 There are a
number of suggested explanations for the rejection of this use of the
Rule in this country, none of which are persuasive. 44 However, in light
of the reluctance of our courts to override precedent, legislation will
undoubtedly be necessary if -rights of re-entry are to be brought under
the Rule in the United States.
Although specific performance for breach of a covenant and for-
feiture for breach of a conditi~n are concededly penalties when changed
40. However, the validity of a condition subsequent may be attacked in an
action to quiet title. Cf. Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Buck, 79 N.J. Eq. 472, 82
Atl. 418 (1912), involving a determinable fee. It is now settled that title may be quieted
as against equitable restrictions in the event of materially altered circumstances. Clark,
Limiting Land Restrictions, 27 A.B.A.I. 737, 740 n.20 (1941).
41. At least one important jurisdiction has so held in the case of an unenforce-
able covenant. Bull v. Burton, 227 N.Y. 101, 124 N.E. 111 (1919). See, Pound, The
Progress of the Law, 1918-1919, 33 HARV. L. Rav. 813, 820 (1920); Walsh, Can-
ditional Estates and Covenants Running with the Land, 14 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 162, 178 n.42
(1936).
42. See cases cited in GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 336 n.3-4 (4th
ed., R. Gray, 1942). Rights of re-entry are now within the Rule Against Perpetuities
by virtue of legislation in England. Law of Property Act., 1925, 15 GEO. 5, c. 20, § 4(3).
See Bordwell, English Property Reform and Its Anerican Aspects, 37 YALE L.J.
179, 197 (1927).
43. GRAY, op. cit. supra note 42, §§ 304-310; 2 SIMEs, THE LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS 366 n.49 (1936).
44. 2 SI r~s, op. cit. supra noti 43, at 367. For an evaluation of the various
explanations, see Note, 28 MIcH. L. Rav. 1015 (1930).
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circumstances preclude the attainment of the purposes of the restrictions,
it may be argued that this is not true in the case of a determinable fee.
There, it can be said, no intention of the holder of the possibility of
reverter to exact the penalty of forfeiture for a "breach" is involved;
instead, the estate automatically ends because it has expired under the
terms of the instrument creating it-as does a life estate upon the death
of the person for whose life it was given. This somewhat tenuous dis-
tinction between a fee on condition subsequent and a determinable fee
would be more acceptable if the law restricted determinable fees to estates
terminating on the occurrence of stipulated collateral events, beyond the
control of the parties. Since termination may be dependent upon com-
pliance with a course of action prescribed by the creators, determinable
fees may presently operate to control land use continuously and
indefinitely. 4" At present, courts refuse to apply the Rule Against Per-
petuities to possibilities of reverter,4 6 or to terminate determinable fees
on the basis of changed conditions.4 7
Thus, while courts may indicate a willingness to limit conditions
subsequent which are unlimited in time, the equivalent of such conditions
can be created by way of determinable fee without risking future judicial
interference. 48  The determinable fee, as yet, provides a "fool-proof"
method for the conveyancer who would perpetuate the "dead hand" con-
trol of land use. Whether, or how long, this will remain so, depends upon
the propriety with which the instruments creating these interests are
drawn, and the extent to which they are efnployed. 9
There have been a few legislative attempts to control the ceation of
perpetuities by way of condition subsequent, or to restrict the types of
45. See cases collected in 1 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 385 n.88.
46. 2 SIMES, op. cit. supra note 43, § 507. Tiffany has argued that' it is, indeed.
impossible to do so, because a possibility of reverter is the necessary legal result of the
creation of a determinable fee. Since the law permits determinable fees, it cannot then
intervene to destroy what it holds valid. 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 404. But
see 2 SIMES, op. cit. supra note 43, § 508.
47. It has been suggested, however, that the doctrine of Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal.
App. 584, 10 P.2d 496 (1932), might well be extended to determinable fees. Goldstein,
supra note 13, at 275.
48. This is so, in part, because, in theory, a determinable fee is not unlimited
as to time. But, if the language of the creating instrument is ambiguous, an estate in
fee simple subject to a condition subsequent will be favored over a determinable fee.
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 45, comment in (1936). It has been strongly contended, but
never held, that the Statute Quia Emptores renders the determinable fee invalid as a
form of estate. See GRAY, op. cit. supra note 42, § 31 et seq.
49. Commenting upon those determinable fees which are created for the sole pur-
pose of controlling land use, one writer predicted, nearly thirty years ago, that "a
vast unharvested crop [of litigation concerning the validity of such estates] will soon
approach the knife for judicial cutting." POWELL, Determinable Fees, 23 CoL. L. Rav.
NOTES
conditions which may be created by deed. The Massachusetts statute
provides that conditions unlimited as to time shall be effective for only
thirty years, except in cases of gifts or devises for public, charitable, or
religious purposes.50 However, the statute does not invalidate conditions
subsequent which are limited in time, even though that time be clearly
unreasonable. The express exclusion of gifts or devises for public, char-
itable, or religious purposes suggests that the statute's chief purpose is
to prevent the forfeiture of money consideration paid for grants. How-
ever, this overlooks the restraint upon alienation imposed by restrictive
conditions which no longer have a justifiable purpose. Certainly many,
if not most, gifts on condition subsequent are for schools, hospitals,
churches, and other public, charitable, or religious purposes. As to these,
the Massachusetts statute would permit perpetuities where no termination
date is expressed in the instrument creating them. But perpetual dedica-
tions of land are contrary to the policy of modern land law which increas-
ingly recognizes that land is a commercial commodity which should be
capable of adaption to its most economical use and should be freely
alienable at the instance of an owner when he has found a willing and
able buyer.
Some statutes provide that conditions which are merely nominal
and evidence no intention of substantial benefit to the grantor at the time
they are created may be disregarded.5 ' This leaves undetermined the
question of what constitutes a "nominal" condition, as well as failing to
consider conditions which become nominal subsequent to their creation.5 2
Perhaps purely personal conditions could be included in the "nominal"
category. Ho~vever, few conditions are purely capricious at the time they
are created, but usually become so only at a later time. Legislation should
adequately provide for these deficiencies. At present, only the Minnesota
statute5 3 makes such provision. That act is also more comprehensive in
its inclusion of conditions created by will.
In addition to the Uniform Estates Act,54 limiting rights of re-entry
as well as possibilities of reverter to twenty-one years, certain writers
have recommended legislation which would invalidate unjustifiable con-
207, 210 (1923). Their creation in the future might well be precluded by the enact-
ment of appropriate legislation.
50. MAss. GmN. LAws c. 184, § 23 (1932), construed in Flynn v. Caplan, 234 Mass.
516, 126 N.E. 776 (1919).
51. MIcH. Comp. LAws § 554.46 (1948); Wis. STAT. § 230.46 (1947).
52. See Fraser, Future Interests in Property i; Minnesota, 3 MINN. L. REV. 320,
338 (1919).
53. Mi,-N. STAT. C. 59, § 8075 (Mason 1927), as amended, Minn. Laws q. 487,
§ 1 (1937).
54. § 15.
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ditions or restrict the duration of privately imposed use restrictions. 55
The weakness of legislation is that its retroactive effect may be limited.
Hence, while statutes may constitutionally terminate conditions which
have become obsolete because of changes in the character of the neigh-
borhood or other similarly altered circumstances, the validity of an
attempt to .legislate an existing condition unlimited in time into one of
definite duration is questionable. Such legislation probably can have
only prospective effect.50 The existing judicial techniques for terminating
conditions subsequent are commendable and reasonably effective devices in
avoiding harsh forfeitures and preventing past actions from controlling
land use indefinitely. However, the traditional judicial reluctance to over-
ride precedent, the uncertainties of litigation, and the present inviolability
of determinable fees often result in the continuance of unwarranted re-
strictions long after the required use has become uneconomical and with-
out present value to anyone. While legislation could remedy many of these
defects, statutes have been infrequent and may well be constitutionally
inapplicable to those restrictions in effect at the time of enactment.
Transferors of land desiring to place reasonable restrictions upon
its future use should consider carefully the implications of the device
selected. Unless a future windfall in the form of a forfeiture is con-
templated, a covenant will ordinarily suffice and will avoid needless
penalties on the transferee. Moreover, in jurisdictions where rights of
re-entry and possibilities of reverter are non-alienable5 7 a covenant will
usually more nearly effectuate the transferor's intent and will redound
to his greater benefit. Restrictions beneficial to the land expressed in
terms of covenant -will survive conveyance to a stranger,58 thus, often
increasing the value and marketability of the retained estate.
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE AND COMPETENCY
IN INDIANA
The ultimate objective of exclusionary rules of evidence is to admit
all reliable facts, thereby facilitating just disposition of a legal con-
troversy, while rejecting all testimony so dubious as to render it repugnant
55. See Clark, Limiting Land Restrictions, 27 A.B.A.J. 737 (1941) ; WALSH, Con.-
ditional Estates and Covenants Rnnninrg with the Land, 14 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 162, 194
n.80 (1936) ; Legis., [1940] Wis. L. REv. 121 (1940).
56. See Clark, Limiting Land Restrictions, 27 A.B.A.J. 737, 739 (1941) ; Goldstein,
supra note 13, at 275 n.103.
57. See notes 2 and 3 supra.
58. WALSH, op. cit. supra note 55, at 165.
